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 A B S T R A C T  
This study investigates market reaction to a political event, which is the presidential 
election of Republic of Indonesia in 2014 by studying 387 publicly-traded firms in the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. It employs event study method to measure the information 
content of this event. By going deeper, this study looked at the effect difference between 
government-controlled firms (partially privatized firms) and private firms. The results 
show that there was a significant abnormal return around the event date. The negative 
abnormal return one day before the election date, which was followed by rebounding 
one day after the event, indicate that investors consider that the election had been done 
well particularly with respect to the political stability and security. Moreover, this 
paper reveals that the effect of presidential election is more pronounced for govern-
ment-controlled firms than private firms. Government-controlled firms may be more 
susceptible to political event.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini menguji reaksi pasar terhadap peristiwa politik yaitu pemilihan presiden 
Republik Indonesia pada tahun 2014 dengan menggunakan data 387 perusahaan 
Indonesia yang sahamnya diperdagangkan di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Peneliti menggu-
nakan metode event study untuk mengukur kandungan informasi dari peristiwa ini. 
Lebih jauh, kami melihat perbedaan efek dari peristiwa ini pada peru-sahaan yang 
dikendalikan oleh pemerintah (perusahaan milik negara yang diprivatisasi sebagian) 
dengan perusahaan yang dimiliki oleh swasta. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bah-
wa ada abnormal return yang signifikan pada sekitar tanggal peristiwa. Abnormal 
return yang negatif sehari sebelum tanggal pemilihan yang kemudian diikuti dengan 
pembalikan sehari sesudah peristiwa mengindikasikan bahwa investor merasa bahwa 
pemilihan tersebut telah terselenggara dengan baik khususnya terkait dengan stabili-
tas politik dan keamanan. Lebih lanjut, artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa efek dari pemi-
lihan presiden ini lebih terasa pada perusahaan publik yang dikendalikan oleh peme-
rintah daripada perusahaan swasta. Perusahaan-perusahaan tersebut mungkin lebih 
rentan terhadap peristiwa politik.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It has been widely known that financial markets are 
influenced by various factors including political is-
sues. Click (1996) argues that stock price is asso-
ciated with political situation, which means that 
political risk should be considered by investors. Poli-
tics is essential for business and economy particular-
ly with respect to the financial markets. A safe and 
stable political condition could affect the supply and 
demand of securities as it improves investors’ confi-
dence, which in turn encourage them to invest their 
funds in the market. On the other hand, political 
situation can also affect the fundamental (business 
operation) of firms and the macro economy as a 
whole. 
In this present paper, this study investigates the 
effect of politics on financial markets by looking at 
the market reaction to a political event. Our event 
here is the Indonesia’s presidential election in 2014, 
which is held on July 9, 2014. Presidential election 
has an important role to the financial markets due to 
it is directly and indirectly related to the uncertainty 
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particularly with regards to the macroeconomic pol-
icies and regimes that will be taken by the govern-
ment (Chau et al. 2014; Goodell et al. 2015). 
Moreover, in the context of Indonesia, it took 
more attention especially due to there would be a 
new Indonesian president1. Therefore, it creates 
much higher uncertainty compared to the election 
where the incumbent run and has a higher probabili-
ty to be re-elected. Investors still wonder on the poli-
cies and programs of the new government especially 
concerning the economic and financial markets even 
though in the political campaign the candidates have 
explained their vision, mission and programs to 
achieve vision. 
Some empirical papers have revealed the signif-
icant effect of political factors on the stock market 
behavior. A number of studies employ event studies 
to look at the information content provided by a 
political event. On the other hand, rather than focus-
ing on a specific event, some others use time-series 
model to capture a long-term effect of a political 
factor. 
More recently, Gunay (2016) investigates the ef-
fects of internal political risk on the Turkish stock 
market using time-series estimation. He concludes 
that political risk still matters in explaining the stock 
market in Turkey; however, the susceptibility of 
stock market to political risk has decreased in the 
recent years. 
Political events are systematic risk due to the 
risk resulting from those events could not be mini-
mized by diversifying portfolio. In other words, all 
of stocks in the market should be influenced by such 
events. However, how much the effect could be dif-
ferent between firms. Accordingly, going deeper, 
this study look at the difference in market reaction 
between state-owned firms and private firms. 
Following the economic recovery after the crisis 
in the late 1990’s, the Indonesian government has 
partially privatized a number of state-owned firms 
through initial public offerings. However, the gov-
ernment is still the majority shareholder. Widely 
considered, the strategy, direction and policy of gov-
ernment-controlled firms are influenced by the vi-
sion of the government. Moreover, it has the control 
right to appoint or select board of directors and 
board of commissioners. This indicates that whoever 
wins or get elected in the presidential election or 
____________ 
 
1 The former President SBY has already been two periods in his 
position that could not allow him to run in the presidential 
election according to the constitution. There were two candi-
dates in the 2014 election; Ir. Joko Widodo (at this time was the 
Governor of Jakarta) and Letjend (Purn) Prabowo Subianto (a 
former military general). 
government succession will determine how gov-
ernment-controlled firms will be managed onward 
which subsequently determine the firm performance 
in the future. 
This study employed an event study to measure 
the information content of this event. There have 
been a number of studies employing event study to 
test the informational content of a political event. 
However, there were few studies have investigated 
the information content of governmental succession 
particularly for government-controlled firms. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Market Reaction to Political Event 
Information is the essence of capital market. In the 
efficient market hypothesis postulated by Fama 
(1970, 1991), market efficiency could be achieved 
when the price of all traded securities has reflected 
all the information available in the market. In a 
strong efficient market, there will be no investor who 
can gain an abnormal return. Some previous studies 
have revealed that Indonesian capital market is cate-
gorized as semi strong in which it is possible for 
investors to gain abnormal return. The abnormal 
return reflects the delay to absorb and interpret the 
information 
According to McWilliams & Siegel (1997), event 
study is a method used to determine the existence of 
abnormal return, which could also reflect the signi-
ficance of an event. Peterson (1989) also mentions 
that event study is a method to examine the changes 
in stock price in capital market to investigate wheth-
er there is abnormal return gained by investors due 
to an event. 
Event study has been applied in some fields 
particularly in finance and accounting, to study var-
ious events either firm, industry or market levels. 
Some have also empirically investigated the infor-
mation content of political events. Chen et al. (2005) 
test the effect of various political events on stock 
performance in Taiwan market. In general, the result 
shows that the stock market reacts to political events 
as shown by the presence of significant abnormal 
return around the event dates. Oehler et al. (2012) 
study the market reaction during US election in 
1976-2008. They find the presence of significant ab-
normal return in the most industries, both in positive 
and negative value. Guidolin & Ferrara (2010) ana-
lyze the effect of conflict attack that takes place 
worldwide on the assets market in the US, the UK, 
France, and Japan. They find that some markets 
show mixed reaction (positive and negative). More-
over, international conflict has a stronger effect than 
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internal conflict. Christofis et al. (2013) investigate 
the effect of three terrorism incidents in Turkey on 
the stock price in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. They 
document that the effect of the event is significant in 
several cases; however, the effect only takes place in 
a short period because market rebound quickly. 
Based on the industry, tourism firms is the most 
suffered industry. In the context of Indonesia, Se-
tyawan & Suryawijaya (1998) test market reaction to 
political incident on 27 July 1996. They revealed that 
market reacted negatively (significant negative ab-
normal return) and spontaneously on the event date. 
This present paper is primarily aimed at inves-
tigating the market reaction to the 2014 presidential 
election in Indonesia. Previous studies (Suryawijaya 
& Setiawan, 1998; Chen et al. 2005; Oehler et al. 2012; 
Guidolin & Ferrara, 2010; Christofis et al. 2013) re-
veal that political events have significant informa-
tional content and mostly find negative abnormal 
return due to the use of terrible political incidents. 
However, as the event here is a presidential election, 
this study expects that market will react, yet, how 
market reacts is unpredictable. Thus, the hypothesis 
is formulated as follows: 
H1 : There is a significant abnormal return around 
the presidential election. 
 
The Role of Government-Controlled Firms 
This study goes deeper by looking at the effect dif-
ference between government-controlled firms and 
private firms. Basically, there are two theories to 
explain the role of government-controlled firms. The 
social or development theory argues that the pres-
ence of such firms is needed to help the government 
in the development program (Trinugroho et al. 
2014). 
The political theory contends that those firms 
are exploited by politicians for their self-interest. 
According to the seminal work of Shleifer and Vish-
ny (1994) on the grabbing hand theory, state-owned 
enterprises may not perform efficiently due to they 
are subject of politicians and bureaucrats. Politicians 
and bureaucrats have an incentive to extract re-
sources from those firms because they have the 
power to do so. 
Following the 1997/1998 financial and econom-
ic crisis, as a part of the restructuring program, the 
Indonesian government partially privatized some 
state-owned firms through initial public offerings. 
The government, however, keeps their majority 
ownership (Prabowo et al. 2014). 
This study argues that partially privatized gov-
ernment-controlled firms will be more affected by 
political event especially the presidential election. 
Arguably, as those firms are controlled by the gov-
ernment, who will be the president is more impor-
tant for the minority shareholders. The newly regime 
can determine the policy and strategy of the firms 
which are translated by board of directors under the 
supervision of board of commissioners. The board 
members are elected or appointed in the sharehold-
ers general meeting, however, as the government is 
the majority, most of the members are representative 
of the government. Thus, the second hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
H2 : Government-controlled firms have higher ab-
normal return around the presidential election. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Data 
This study the market reaction to the presidential 
election in Indonesia by studying publicly-traded 
firms in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (ISE). The 
election was held on 9 July 2014. This study exclude 
firms that did corporate actions during the windows 
period to avoid the confounding effect. This study 
also do not account for firms having incomplete fi-
nancial information. Finally, 387 firms are included 
in our sample. 
This study collects the information of stock price 
Table 1 
Result of One-Sample T-Test  
Period Date df AAR t-statistic Sig. (2-tailed) 
t-5 2-Jul-14 386 0.0009476350 0.611 0.541 
t-4 3-Jul-14 386 0.0014537343 0.702 0.483 
t-3 4-Jul-14 386 0.0003689728 0.186 0.853 
t-2 7-Jul-14 386 0.0052464104 2.902*** 0.004 
t-1 8-Jul-14 386 -0.0036658565 -2.504** 0.013 
t+1 10-Jul-14 386 0.0035947146 1.795* 0.073 
t+2 11-Jul-14 386 -0.0050778265 -3.668*** 0.000 
t+3 14-Jul-14 386 -0.0015728447 -1.041 0.299 
t+4 15-Jul-14 386 0.0019905389 0.777 0.437 
t+5 16-Jul-14 386 0.0104800497 2.548** 0.011 
*, **, and ***indicates the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
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in the ISE and the www.finance.yahoo.com. Finan-
cial information is gathered from the firms’ financial 
statements, which are published in the ISE. 
 
Event Study 
The event period is during five days before and after 
the events (t-5 to t+5). The short event period may 
not be able to capture the overall market reactions, 
while longer event period will make a market reac-
tion to become vague due to the possible confound-
ing effects. However, this study also use three days 
before and after the event (t-3 up to t+3) to provide a 
comprehensive picture. Estimation period is 100 
days before the event period using. Although the 
event date (t0) on 9 July 2014 is a public holiday and 
there is no trading activity in the capital market, this 
study keeps it as the event date (t0). This study em-
ploys standard t-test to test the significance of ab-
normal return in each day within the periods. 
 
Regression 
As explained earlier, this study also investigates the 
effect difference between government-controlled 
firms and private firms. To do so, this study builds 
an empirical model. The dependent variable is cu-
mulative abnormal return (CAR). Our main explana-
tory variable is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 
for government-controlled firms (the government is 
majority shareholder) and 0 otherwise. 
This study includes a number of control va-
riables. First, firm size is included. It is measured by 
the natural logarithm of total assets in 2013 (LNTA). 
Second, this study takes into account firm leverage 
by including the ratio of debt to total assets (DAR) in 
2013. Lastly, this study control for industries follow-
ing the JASICA classification. Therefore, this study 
 
 
Figure 1 
Average Abnormal Return (AAR) during the Windows Period 
 
 
Figure 2 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) during Windows Period 
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create a number of dummy variables to represent the 
industry differences which are Agriculture; Mining; 
Basic Industry and Chemicals; Consumer Goods; 
Property, Real Estate, and Building Construction; 
Infrastructure, Utilities, and Transportation; Finance; 
and Trade, Service, and Investment. The miscellane-
ous industry is the benchmark. 
As it is a cross section research, ordinary least 
square (OLS) will be employed to examine the fol-
lowing regression models. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅3𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑀𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐵𝑈𝑖 +
𝛽9𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑈𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 +
𝛽11𝐷𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . (1) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅5𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑀𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐵𝑈𝑖 +
𝛽9𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑈𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 +
𝛽11𝐷𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑁𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 . (2) 
Note: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅3𝑖  = cumulative abnormal return during three 
days windows period (t-3 to t+3) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅5𝑖  = cumulative abnormal return during five 
days windows period (t-5 to t+5) 
𝐷𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖  = dummy variable for government-controlled 
firms 
𝐿𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑖  = natural logarithm of total assets 
𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑖  = debt to total assets ratio 
𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑖  = dummy variable for agriculture industry 
𝐷𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖  = dummy variable for mining industry 
𝐷𝐵𝐴𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑀i  = dummy variable for basic industry 
and chemicals 
𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐷i  = dummy variable for consumer 
goods industry 
𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐵𝑈i  = dummy variable property, real es-
tate, and building construction industry 
𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑈𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆i= dummy variable for infrastructure, 
utilities, and transportation 
𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸i  =  dummy variable for finance industry 
𝐷𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑁i = dummy variable for trade, ser-
vice, and investment industry 
𝜀𝑖  = error term. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Event Study 
Table 1 presents the results of t-test. There are five 
days during the windows period that generate sig-
nificant abnormal return which are t-2, t-1, t+1, t+2, 
and t+5. 
In the pre-event days, market tended to fluc-
tuate. It was shown that abnormal return in t-5 until 
t-3 is relatively stable and insignificant, it then be-
comes positive and significant in the t-2 which was 
then followed by a negative and significant reaction 
on t-1. 
A day after the election (t+1), there was a re-
bound in stock market and the curve was changing, 
showing a positive significant abnormal return. 
However, this did not persist because the in subse-
quent day (t+2), the abnormal return curve changed 
its direction and showed a negative and significant 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Number of 
Observation  
CAR3 CAR5 
Total Assets 
(Billion Rp) 
DAR 
Full sample 387 
Mean -0.001398 0.013759 16567.84 0.53062 
Median -0.003289 0.010109 2383 0.53 
Maximum 1.161841 0.934754 733100 3.35 
Minimum -0.768692 -1.07701 14.96 0.00 
Std. Dev. 0.100415 0.126623 63334.99 0.308948 
Skewness 2.960679 -0.515332 8.055287 2.686373 
       
Government-
controlled firms 
20 
Mean 0.056541 0.126271 113730.90 0.5825 
Median 0.06458 0.076018 25115.50 0.59 
Maximum 0.124607 0.934754 733100 0.91 
Minimum -0.018158 0.011042 1295 0.09 
Std. Dev. 0.046875 0.196947 212984.70 0.245504 
Skewness -0.185432 3.687716 2.115385 -0.177523 
       
Private firms 367 
Mean -0.004556 0.007627 11272.86 0.527793 
Median -0.00434 0.004269 2109 0.53 
Maximum 1.161841 0.647522 496305 3.35 
Minimum -0.768692 -1.077010 14.96 0.00 
Std. Dev. 0.10162 0.119023 36491.64 0.312059 
Skewness 3.078125 -1.795935 8.370135 2.764777 
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abnormal return. On the t+3 and t+4, capital market 
made another rebound, which was resulted in posi-
tive and significant abnormal return in t+5 after the 
presidential election. 
Arguably, the negative significant abnormal re-
turn occurred in t-1 before the presidential elections 
shows that investors tend to take wait and see posi-
tion due to political uncertainty. A substantial por-
tion of investors prefer to sell their stocks until the 
election be done. The significant abnormal return in 
t+1 after the elections is due to market feel confident 
in term of political stability and security. 
There was a negative abnormal return in the 
t+2. However, this is not quite surprising because it 
is estimated that there was profit taking after the 
significant and positive return in the previous day. It 
is proved with the increase in the average abnormal 
return curve until it reached the peak at t+5 after the 
presidential elections. Generally, it can be concluded 
that the presidential election in 2014 leads to overall 
positive market reaction. 
The empirical evidence of a relatively positive 
market reaction is also presented by the changes in 
cumulative average abnormal return in Figure 2. De-
spite the volatility, the cumulative average abnormal 
return is always positive during the windows period. 
The political event of Indonesian presidential 
election in 2014 has a significant informational con-
tent, which is in line with the previous studies (e.g. 
Suryawijaya & Setiawan, 1998; Chen et al. 2005; Oeh-
ler et al. 2012). Indonesian capital market is consi-
dered as semi-strong with respect to its market effi-
ciency. This is due to the existence of prolonged ab-
normal return in the more than three time spots 
around the event. As explained by Fama (1970), if 
abnormal return is prolonged, it means that market 
response is late in absorbing and interpreting the 
information. 
Table 4 
Regression Results 
  
  
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
CAR3 CAR5 
DGCF 2.346325** 3.087946*** 
 
(0.0195) (0.0022) 
LNTA -0.668322 1.456982 
 
(0.5043) (0.146) 
DAR 0.593895 0.38151 
 
(0.5529) (0.703) 
DAGRI 0.50262 -0.443259 
 
(0.6155) (0.6578) 
DMINING 0.118676 0.217826 
 
(0.9056) (0.8277) 
DBASCHEM 1.454057 1.234626 
 
(0.1468) (0.2177) 
DCONSGOOD 0.748589 0.031917 
 
(0.4546) (0.8423) 
DPROPESBU 3.416721*** 3.669929*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0003) 
DINFUTRANS 2.054381** 1.54573 
 
(0.0406) (0.123) 
DFINANCE 1.11479 0.840312 
 
(0.2657) (0.4013) 
DTRADSERVIN 1.151495 0.859197 
 
(0.2503) (0.3908) 
Method OLS OLS 
Observations 387 387 
Constant Included Included 
R-squared 0.067000   0.107958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.039632   0.081791 
F-statistic 2.448111 4.125801 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005823 0.000009 
The value in the brackets is p-value. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels consecutively. 
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Regression Results 
Table 2 exhibits the descriptive statistics of va-
riables for the regression on the determinants of 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). It is found that 
the average CAR5 of government-controlled firms 
(0.126271) is higher than private firms (0.007627). 
Similarly, the average CAR3 of private firms is 
lower than government-controlled firms are. Table 
3 presents the correlation matrix of variables (see in 
Appendices). As expected, the dummy variable of 
government-controlled firms (DGCF) is positively 
correlated with the cumulative abnormal return 
both three days (CAR3) and five days (CAR5) 
around the event date. 
The regression results on the determinants of 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR3 and CAR5) are 
presented in Table 4. The coefficients of the dummy 
variable to represent the government-controlled 
firms are found to be positive and significant which 
means that those firms have a higher abnormal re-
turn during the windows period. It confirms our 
hypothesis that the effect of political event particu-
larly presidential election is more pronounced for 
government-controlled firms. As revealed by Fisman 
(2001), closeness with political power has an impact 
on the market value of firms particularly in the 
emerging markets. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This study investigates market reaction to a political 
event, which is the presidential election of Republic of 
Indonesia in 2014 by studying publicly traded firms in 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange. First, this study does 
find that there is significant abnormal return during 
windows period particularly in the t-2, t-1, t+1, t+2, 
and t+5. Second, the negative abnormal return one 
day before the election date, which was followed by 
rebounding one day after the event, indicate that in-
vestors consider that the election has been done well 
particularly with respect to the political stability and 
security. Third, government-controlled firms have a 
higher abnormal return than private firms do, which 
means that they are more susceptible to political event 
especially the presidential election. Fourth, confirm-
ing some previous studies, Indonesian capital market 
is a semi-strong market in which it is possible for in-
vestors to gain abnormal return. 
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